Maryland Journal of International Law
Volume 29
Issue 1 Symposium: "The International Law and
Politics of External Intervention in Internal Conflicts"
and Special Issue: "Politics of Religious Freedom"

Article 5

Critical Perspectives on Intervention: Thoughts in
Response to Professor Richardson’s Keynote
Lecture
Maxwell O. Chibundu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil
Recommended Citation
Maxwell O. Chibundu, Critical Perspectives on Intervention: Thoughts in Response to Professor Richardson’s Keynote Lecture, 29 Md. J. Int'l
L. 50 (2014).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mjil/vol29/iss1/5

This Symposium: Keynote Address is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Maryland Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more
information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

RESPONSE

Critical Perspectives on Intervention:
Thoughts in Response to Professor
Richardson’s Keynote Lecture
MAXWELL O. CHIBUNDU †
INTRODUCTION
“No man is an island, Entire of itself, Every man is a piece of the
continent, A part of the main.”1
“I trust the president. I like the president. I think he's doing the
right thing. We cannot allow thugs like Assad to gas his own
people.”2
As I write this response to Professor Henry Richardson’s rousing
reflections on the problem of interventions in civil strife,3 two stories
running side by side in the popular press capture the complexities of
the problem. In the first, a piece of national legislation in Uganda that
criminalizes homosexuality understandably has not only drawn the
protests and ire of “gay rights activists” in the West, but also has
seemingly generated consequential punitive actions by Western
governments including the withdrawal or suspension of development
assistance to the Ugandan state.4 Of particular note, the World Bank,
an institution currently run by a medical doctor and whose policies
are shaped in Washington, D. C., reportedly has “suspended,” as a
† Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of
Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude to his students and the editors of
the Maryland Journal of International Law for the opportunity to reflect on the
thoughts expressed in this commentary and for their editorial help.
1. JOHN DONNE, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND 1 (Keith Fallon ed., 1970).
2. Eliot Engel, PBS Newshour (PBS television broadcast Aug. 30, 2013),
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world-july-dec13-syria2_08-30/.
3. See See Henry J. Richardson III, Critical Perspectives on Intervention,
29 MD. J. INT’L L. 12 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Alan Cowell, Uganda’s President Signs Antigay Bill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 25, 2014, at A9.
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response to the Ugandan legislation, the disbursement of $90,000,000
of financial assistance already promised to the health sector of
Ugandan society.5 But since the “state” has no corporeal existence,
the consequences of the suspension apparently will be visited
primarily on the children, mothers and HIV patients who depend on
government-funded centers for their health-care needs.6 The second
story is the dramatic denouement of a long-running strife within the
Ukrainian state. Shortly after Professor Richardson delivered his
lecture, fissures in Ukrainian society evident as early as 2004 in the
so-called “Orange revolution” reasserted themselves with renewed
vigor.7 In November 2013, a significant portion of Ukrainian society
began demonstrating against the policies of their Government
regarding the scope of and choices in the relationships of the
Ukrainian state and its two powerful neighbors: Russia and the
European Union.8 The street demonstrations ultimately led to the
downfall of the then existing government, and fears of the carving up
of the Ukrainian state into spheres of territorial influence—if not
outright partition—between the “West” (as represented by the
European Union” and Russia.9
What I find striking (and preliminarily wish to highlight here), is
less the admittedly absorbing drama of the Ukrainian conflict, but
rather the rhetoric of “nonintervention” coming out of Washington.
That rhetoric which “warns” Russia not to “intervene” in matters that
are purportedly about the “sovereignty,” territorial integrity, political
independence and “democratic” practices of Ukraine,10 is in
significant contrast to the calls for and policies of direct and
unapologetic intervention in Syria. As the Syrian civil war has
unfolded, politicians, and pundits in the United States (or, for that
5. Danielle Douglas, Here is Why the World Bank Withheld Aid to Uganda,
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2
014/04/03/here-is-why-the-world-bank-withheld-aid-to-uganda/.
6. Uganda Says Healthcare is For All Despite Anti-Gay Law, BBC NEWS,
(Feb. 25, 2014, 9:47 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26349166
(predicting consequences for withholding aid).
7. David M. Herszenhorn, Ukraine in Turmoil After Leaders Reject Major E.U.
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, at A6.
8. Id.
9. David M. Herszenhorn, As Ukrainian Election Looms, Western Powers and
Russia Campaign for Influence, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2014, at A4.
10. Andrew Higgins & David M. Herszenhorn, U.S. and NATO Warn Russia
Against Further Intervention in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2014, at A4;
President Barack Obama, Statement on Ukraine (Feb. 28, 2014) (“It would be a
clear violation of Russia’s commitment to respect the independence and
sovereignty and borders of Ukraine, and of international laws.”).
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matter, the West in general) have not framed the issue of external
involvement in that strife-torn country as one of interference in the
political independence or territorial integrity of the Syrian state or
indeed of Syrian society. The various interventions that they advocate
have been justified by appeals to pragmatic geopolitical
considerations or claims about morally correct “humanitarian”
policies. Indeed, remarkable by its absence from the vocabulary has
been reference to international law rules; and this is so, even when
resort to Security Council Resolutions have been sought. (At least
this was the case until President Barack Obama’s anticlimactic
August 31, 2013 speech).11
The following Response reviews and comments on the issue of
intervention in three parts. Part I outlines three possible prisms
through which the question can be viewed. The summary seeks to
point out in a descriptive sense the nature of the distinctions and the
connections that are inherent in any attempt at a systematic
comprehension of the subject matter of intervention. By setting out
the various prisms through which the idea of intervention can be
explored, this Part should be considered as an argument for
subjecting the presumed objectivity of an academic statement to the
tests of the validity of its underlying assumptions, the cohesion of the
internal elements of the claim, and the reliability of those claims visà-vis outside realities. Parsing the prisms of intervention makes
possible a nuanced evaluation of the competing claims for its
appropriateness in varied settings, even if ultimately one concludes
that myopia as to one or more of these lenses is the better approach.
The second part of the essay employs the lens of the legal—more
specifically of international law—to illuminate the dimensions of the
problem of “intervention” and “nonintervention” as currently
embedded in international politics. The presentation here eschews the
objective sounding monocular focus on “the international
community” which tends to obscure the nature of the problem.12
Rather, the approach invites the reader to consider the relevant issues
from two perspectives that should be but which are rarely juxtaposed
in the discussion: that from within and from without a strife-torn
11. I take up this disparity below. See infra 76–77.
12. Cf. Richardson, supra note 3, at 12 (“Our current inquiry about
intervention must start with the global community. It is a community in its
comprehensive empirical, factual linkages and intersecting processes among all
states and peoples of the world.”).
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society. In other words, I seek to explore the legitimacy of
intervention from the perspectives of the outside actor and of the
insider beneficiary or victim of the intervention. It is, after all, the
particularized interests of these groups, not the abstractions of an
over-imagined—if not illusory—“international community” that are
ultimately at stake and which therefore drive the discussions. Finally,
Part III explores the light that contemporary legal and philosophical
stances on intervention sheds on a central interest of Professor
Richardson’s scholarship (and mine as well): namely, the place of
power in shaping, defining and legitimizing the legally acceptable.13
The focus here is on seeking to explain and understand the shift that
philosophies of interventionism have undergone during the last
quarter century: from the covert and (if reluctantly) use of
intervention as a subterfuge for the exercise of power to the overt and
avowedly unapologetic argument for intervention in the service of
some asserted greater universal good.
I.

THREE FACES OF INTERVENTION DISCOURSES

As is all too often the case in the humanities, a term is as likely
as not to divide as to unify those who deploy it. Indeed, the ambiguity
of meaning may be essential in order to permit those temporary but
convenient alliances of interests and flexible coalitions without which
virtually no complex society can function. Language thus exhibits a
paradox. It must obscure its true meaning in order to permit
temporary alliances. But that meaning must be susceptible of constant
interrogation and reinterpretation if it is to avoid becoming irrelevant
in a world of shifting interests, coalitions and arrangements. This is
the paradox that is indisputably evident in attempting to give meaning
to the concept of intervention. It is the paradox whose threads this
part seeks to disentangle by examining the concept of intervention as
it appears in three domains: the moral; the political; and the legal.
First, let me provide a general statement of the concept that informs
the pursuit of the disentanglement in all three epistemological realms.

13. As Professor Richardson quite properly frames the issue:
“An inescapable inquiry arising from this constitutive question is whether
regarding intervention—however we define it—international law has
ceased to reflect and bless the raw patterns of power, domination,
subordination and race that it did structure and bless for some four
centuries, prior to confirming the formal illegality of European and other
colonialism in the mid-twentieth century.”
Richardson, supra note 3, at 14.
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At core, the idea of “intervention” implicates the propriety of the
involvement of an outsider in the matters of another. There are
certainly instances in which such involvement would be accepted not
only as permissible, but indeed necessary. Not to intervene in such
instances would be considered irresponsible, if not an outright wrong.
But that in order to flourish, the “self” must be allowed some degree
of autonomous existence (that is, independence of the self in the
management of one’s own affairs from interference by others,
however well intended), is equally indisputable. Drawing the
boundaries of permissible involvement and those of impermissible
interference is the project of any discourse on “intervention.14 This is
a discourse that is no less applicable to issues relating to the
autonomy of the individual or family, as it is to that of the society,
state or community. At issue in these cases is the appropriate level of
the involvement of an outsider in the self-realization of the person
being acted upon. To frame the issue in this way is to introduce a
second element of “intervention”; that is, the idea of involvement
carries with it the propriety of the means with which the involvement
is undertaken. Conduct that may be deemed proper if peacefully,
quietly, or respectfully promoted, may be considered improper if
noisily or coercively carried out. Similarly, even coercive conduct
that at first glance may appear improper may be legitimate if
undertaken in the exercise of legally conferred rights. Here, I want to
briefly articulate frameworks for exploring the boundaries of the
permissible and the impermissible when the other seeks to insert
itself into the province of the self.
A.

The Moral Dimensions of Intervention

That we are each the other’s keeper is as close to a universally
acknowledged moral imperative as there is.15 As John Dunne’s
opening epigram to this essay nicely illustrates, the enfolding of
one’s life in the affairs of the other is at once both ontological and
14. There might be, of course, areas of overlapping uncertainties; that is, when
it might be impossible to say categorically that involvement is permissible or
impermissible. It is precisely for this reason that is essential not only to view the
problem through different lenses, but to be clear-eyed as to the optics of the
commentator’s perception.
15. The idea of “the moral” as used here refers to a belief in the existence of an
intrinsic “right” and “wrong” that is internal to the self. This criterion is
necessarily subjective.
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deontological. The instinct for self-development and self-preservation
compels that we look out for our neighbors both as an expression of
our moral worthiness and as a means for safeguarding the well-being
of the other. The realization of both goals, it is generally thought,
contribute to the happiness and ultimate well-being of the self.16
Involvement in the affairs of the other is thus justifiable as a
moral undertaking circumscribed by two factors: the extent to which
we are in fact motivated by the need to address the travails of the
other, and the means that one chooses for doing so. But even
presuming good intentions, one may nonetheless be concerned about
the consequences of the intervention in terms of whether it
undermines or promotes these dual but interrelated objectives. While
the ultimate goal of what is morally proper is the satisfaction of the
predilections of the self, that satisfaction cannot exist in the absence
of the protection of the welfare of the other. Often, this requires a
focus on the means employed to bring about the intersections of the
interests of the self and of the other. Thus, a means that reduces the
capacity of the other autonomously to make decisions for her own
welfare may be deemed morally unacceptable even when it would
appear to enhance the capacity of the self. Here, however,
examination of those means often occur less through the prism of
morality than that of politics.
But can intervention be discussed as a moral construct without
viewing it as an imperative? Put another way, morality surely
requires intervention in appropriate cases, just as much as it forbids it
in appropriate cases. Yet, rarely do proponents of intervention on
moral grounds see it in binary divisions. Even while vigorously
urging intervention, the “right” to engage in it is almost always
presented in permissive terms. There almost always is a claimed
space for discretion: a situation where the self is free to intervene or
to withhold intervention.
B.

Intervention as a Political Construct

The dominant ethos through which intervention is considered
and evaluated is frequently that of the political. This is because
16. It may be questioned whether the moral element is also implicated if, as an
ontological fact, looking out for the other imposes pain or cost rather than pleasure
on the self. Since the moral debate on intervention in contemporary western
societies is never framed as a command to intervene (only as “right” to intervene),
providing an answer to the question is thus readily avoided.
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politics offers tools for the practical exploration of both of the moral
considerations just presented: motivation and means. The
environment for the exploration, however, is the polity rather than the
person. Under this rubric, in matters of consequence for the idea of
intervention, the self that matters is that constituted by and through
politics. The nation state is, in our contemporary environment, the
quintessential expression of the political community. International
relations are of course premised on recognizing and accepting the
interdependence of nation states and their constitution into a
cooperative community. As Professor Richardson rightly observes,
the international or “global” society is indeed a community because
of the extant “factual linkages and intersecting processes” that bind
peoples and states, and which crisscross trans-boundary relationships.
To that extent, then, it is impossible to view the nation state in
isolation and to take seriously any argument that frames the
permissibility of intervention in terms of the absence of involvement
by one state in the affairs of another. Indeed, cogent arguments for
affirmative interventionist policies can be advanced for much of the
same set of reasons that frame the moral argument for the self being
involved with the other; that is, that trans-boundary involvements are
necessary simultaneously to procure, secure and preserve the welfare
of the self as well as of the other.
The state, however, is not a unitary or atomistic entity; certainly,
as a political entity, it cannot and should not be considered as having
a singular and wholly aggregated existence. The propriety of the
involvement of one state in the affairs of another thus implicates
measures of welfare—both of the self and of the other—that are
absent in the uncomplicated morality equation. Defining the self and
the other in the context of the state demands disaggregating a myriad
of factors that typically are taken as givens in the moral setting. For
example, how is “self-interest”—let alone the interest of the other—
to be determined? How are plural interests to be weighed and
balanced? What criteria are to be employed in evaluating the efficacy
of costs incurred in intervening in the affairs of the other, the
effectiveness of the returns on those costs, and the distributions of the
costs and returns? Politics provides much more satisfactory answers
to these questions because unlike morality, it is not internal to the
self. Rather, politics necessarily engages the self with the other not by
appeal to some internal rule of the self, but through negotiated and/or
coerced interactions among the self and the other. The political prism
thus evaluates intervention through a much more complex set of
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standards and values than does a morally-channeled focus. The prism
is sufficiently capacious to embrace even seemingly disparate values
and standards as expediency, pragmatism, efficacy, and principle.
The morality of the self may prefer one over the other, but the politics
of the community accepts their possible coexistence, however
uneasily or unsteadily the relationships might be.
C.

Law as an Ordering Principle

Into the seeming chaos of possibilities offered up by politics, the
legal framework steps in as an ordering principle. Like politics, but
unlike morality, law offers a prism for decision-making that is
externally induced rather than internally reflective. Law goes beyond
politics by insisting on a binding set of routines that are not driven by
the exigencies of pragmatism. Pragmatic considerations may be
relevant—as indeed may moral ones as well – but such
considerations do not trump established routines or bend to exigent
concerns. The value of the legal prism lies in the analytical structure
that it brings to what might otherwise appear to be free-flowing and
entirely subjective decision-making. The routine of legal analysis
requires identifying an operational text, evaluating that text against
the backdrop of the operational environment of the text, and testing
adherence or compliance with the requirements of the text by those
subject to its prescriptions. It is to these tasks that the next part turns.
II. THE LAW OF INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
International law has a reasonably well-defined text (or, more
accurately, series of texts) for the regulation of intervention by one
state or group of states in the affairs of another. That text is the
product of the rich and dynamic history of relations among states and
the peoples they represent. Indeed, the foundational tale of not only
contemporary international law, but of modern international relations
not infrequently begins by reciting how the princes and potentates of
Europe, worn out from thirty-years of chaotic wars over religion and
rights of monarchical succession decided to reconstruct their
relationships with each other by prohibiting the interference by one
prince in the affairs of the other.17 To be sure, the agreement was
often honored in its breach (as in the Napoleonic wars of 1798-1815
17. The Treaty of Westphalia, signed in 1648, has long been understood as the
foundation of modern international relations. See John W. Foster, The Evolution of
International Law, 18 YALE L.J. 149, 153–55 (1909).
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and the various Ottoman and Balkan conflicts of the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries), but the understanding (or, more accurately,
the mindset that it generated) provided a standard by which the
conduct of monarchs outside of their principalities, empires and
kingdoms could be judged.18 That standard, which lay somewhere in
the interstices of law and of politics, gave rise to and reproduced
three intertwined forces in the Europe-centered world history and
international law of the succeeding three centuries, and which
continue to exert critical influences after the diffusion of European
power following World War II. These forces were “nationalism,”
“balance of power alliances,” and “self-determination.” It is easy
enough to conclusorily present these forces in binary positive or
negative terms, but in reality they represented complex amalgams,
understandings of which are necessary in order to meaningfully
evaluate of the various doctrines of intervention that remain extant.
In nationalism, the “nation state” asserted the right to embody
and to represent the sole and material interests of a people or group of
peoples.19 That right had its justification in history, whether
mythologized or real. The right was framed by and asserted against
the existence of the rights of other peoples, each in turn seen as being
represented by a separate entity with its own distinctive and divergent
interests. Shared governance, geography, culture, and experiences
were seen as glues of statehood. Nationalism thus asserted that right
vis-à-vis other nation states, and it insisted a reciprocal commitment
of unalloyed loyalty from the members of the group. The shield of
non-interference inherent in the Westphalian structure gave to the
emerging nation-states of Europe a wall of national identity behind
which “patriotism” could be fostered, and experiments in leadership,
governance and democracy could be tried out. The experiments and
the realities they produced were by no means peaceful events, but
18. This rule of “noninterference” was not viewed by Europe as applying to
events outside of the continent. Africa was partitioned and colonized without
regard to the rule, and the United States’ announcement of the Monroe doctrine
notwithstanding, Europe felt perfectly comfortable interfering at on whim and at
will in the affairs of Latin American and Asian states, as did the United States.
19. The literature on nationalism is rich and extensive. Illustrative are:
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES (3d ed. 2006) (noting that nations
are creations of modern communication networks); ERIC HOBSBAWM, NATIONS
AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 (1992) (detailing the history of nationalism);
ANTHONY MARX, FAITH IN NATION: EXCLUSIONARY ORIGINS OF NATIONALISM
(2003) (arguing that European nationalism began earlier than previously thought).
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they did result in the strong institutional affiliations of nationhood
that is now the envy of many emerging states.
There necessarily were variations in the successes and failures of
nationality-based state formations. These depended, for example, on
the wisdom or foolishness of the ruler, the cohesiveness of the
population, its capacities for industry and for tolerance. These
features in turn often reflected the pull of such sociological,
historical, and geographical forces as the coherence or lack of
coherence between imagined and provable histories, the practicalities
of geographical boundaries and topology, and the existence (or lack)
of a shared sense of fairness in the apportionment or distribution of
economic resources and social wellbeing. This picture was
complicated by the realities of history and politics, which did not
make the interactions and coexistence of peoples a tidy package.
The philosophies of science and of commerce which shaped,
dominated, and were transmitted by the European Enlightenment, in
theory, should have fundamentally undermined the idea of
nationalism. Those philosophies, after all, at core contested the
validity of claims of preordained hierarchies, ineluctable certainties,
and fixed determinisms in social and political relationships. Far from
threatening nationalism, however, science and commerce proved to
be allies in sustaining it, while reshaping its thrust. The internal group
competition and views of superiority within Europe may have been
mediated by enlightenment thinking, but scientific discoveries,
technological advances, and commercial entrepreneurship simply
expanded the theater of competition from metropolitan Europe to the
quest for possessions and colonies in Africa and Asia. In these latter
theaters, the nationalist ethos was given free reign.
The state as a homogenous entity that was imbued with the
national spirit may have been a useful fiction, but that fiction quite
often butted heads with the inconvenient realities of European
political life. Great European states such as France, Prussia, and even
Russia may have been expressive of the yearnings and interests of
dominant nationalities, but the European political order embodied
interests beyond those of the French or the English to embrace
minority ethnic and confessional groups in such multinational and
multiconfessional empire states as Austro-Hungary and Ottoman
Turkey. Indeed, one of the consequences of the Napoleonic wars was
to reveal the shallowness of the fiction of equating nationality with
the state. The century following the Congress of Vienna can readily
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be summarized as the century of European defragmentation and
consolidation. Nationalism was decisive to the process, but it played
out in quite complicated ways. For example, the idea of German
nationality at best provided an unsatisfactory explanation for the
contiguous existence of the Hansiatic states alongside the AustroHungarian Empire and the Prussian state. While Holland may have
been expressive of Dutch nationality, no such singularity of shared
nationality interests could comfortably explain the treatment of
Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, or a host of other entities as states. The
idea of Greek nationality may have been a romantic rallying cry for
supporting that country’s war of independence from Ottoman
suzerainty, but it proved to be an unreliable basis for creating nation
states out of the Balkan territories and provinces that the Ottoman
Empire was compelled to divest at the twilight of its existence. The
defragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, in particular, severely
tested—as had the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte—the ethos of nonintervention. To Europe’s credit, however, the idea of nonintervention was not enshrined as a legal principle. It was at best a
political concept that shaped behavior as a matter of courtesy.
Nationalism may have provided the glue for cementing—and in
some instances creating—great states, but it also nurtured among
minority groups within multinational empires the yearning for the
expression of their separate identities through the formation of their
own nation states. Thus emerged the notion of self-determination
that, in the twentieth century, came to be formulated as a “right.”
Meanwhile, in the nineteenth– and early–twentieth centuries, the
defragmentation ethos allied itself with the ethos of the balance of
power politics to create a European society of states that preached
noninterference while unavoidably engaging in interventionist
politics. The expedient character of nationality-based relations meant
that intervention often came into play either to protect ethnic or
religious minorities in a multiethnic state or to forestall such
intervention by others. In the absence of authoritative norms or
principles for determining when such intervention was necessary, and
given the possibly existential consequence of a misjudged
intervention, states often formed ad hoc coalitions to sponsor or to
prevent intervention. Some of the best-known European statesmen of
the nineteenth century—Talleyrand, Metternich, Disraeli, and
Bismarck, among others—gained their reputations from the skill or
craftiness they have been adjudged to have shown in their
manipulation of these crises-driven temporary alliances. There were
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of course other factors that went into alliance building, but the
capacities of minority groups within empires and of minor national
states to play off major powers against each other provided a singular
source of stability within the European system. The faltering of the
essential balancing act on which the system was built has been
accepted as one of the major causes of the First World War.20
Unsurprisingly, a response to “the Great War” (whose century
anniversary is now at hand) was to seek to rationalize the conflicting
interactions of the forces of nationalism, self-determination, and
balance of power by replacing the last with the concept of “collective
security.” Where competition among groupings of states had failed to
tame nationalism, entrusting the task of intervention to a collective
body—the Council of the League of Nations—was offered as a
panacea.21 The Council however proved ineffectual – indeed
irrelevant – in containing the nationalist and imperial drive of such
states as Germany, Italy, and Japan, and the result was yet another
“world war.”
In the ensuing peace arrangement, reflected in the Charter of the
United Nations system, international society undertook to regulate
both structurally and substantively the interventionist impulses that
had given rise to two world wars. At the substantive level, the Charter
declared as a foundational principle of international law the “right” of
a people to self-determination.”22 At a minimum, this implied a
people retained the capacity to avoid the subordination of their
interests to those of another group. Although the means for the
exercise of the right was not spelled out in the charter, the post-war
process of decolonization, heavily relying as it did on the normative
force of the right suggested a wide latitude for the construction of the
right. Thus, the process could take the form of peacefully negotiated
constitutional arrangements, or through so-called “wars of national
liberation.” In either case, self-determination there involved the
removal of the subjugation of “natives” by outside imperial powers

20. See generally CHRISTOPHER CLARK, SLEEPWALKERS: HOW EUROPE WENT
TO WAR IN 1914 (2012) (discussing the origins of World War I); MARGARET
MACMILLAN, THE WAR THAT ENDED PEACE: THE ROAD TO 1914 (2013)
(discussing the main people and personalities involved in World War I).
21. League of Nations Covenant art. 11 (“Any war or threat of war…is hereby
declared a matter of concern to the whole League…”).
22. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
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and the rights of the natives to form nation states of their own, a
process that has been referred to as “external self-determination.”23
Alongside the declaration of the principle of self-determination,
the Charter also required member states of the United Nations system
to refrain from challenging the territorial integrity or political
independence of other states through the use of force or the threat of
the use of force.24 This restriction was further extended to apply to
the system, which is explicitly forbidden from interfering in the
“domestic” affairs of a state, subject to a narrow exception for when
the Security Council acts under the authorization of Chapter VII of
the Charter.25 Furthermore, it became accepted that the prohibition
against a member state forcibly interfering in the internal affairs of
another is not merely one under treaty law, but that it is an element of
customary international law, perhaps one rising up to the status of a
jus cogens norm.26
Understanding the boundaries of the regulation of intervention
under international law following World War II thus entails
appreciation of the shifting balance that participants in the
international system sought to strike among competing principles of
recognition. The view emerged that a people constituting a territorial
state had a legal right to political independence that was insulated
from interference by other states and by the international system as a
whole. That right was protected under the principle of collective
security, and is therefore subject to the overriding concern of the
system with maintaining international peace and security. The nation
state, under the banner of self-determination, emphasized the claim to
be left alone to manage her politics free of interference from others.
Within the polity, however, subgroups, invoking the same principle
of self-determination and proto-nationalism, either asserted the right
to form a territorial state of their own, or to substitute governance
provided by their own group over that of the existing government. In
disclaiming the right of intervention in both situations, the
international legal order relied exclusively on the extent to which
international security was compromised by the claims of the national
23. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, ¶ 126 (Can.).
24. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
25. Id., art. 2, para. 7.
26. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27).
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groups. It feigned indifference to the sources of the internal insecurity
within the state, and it pretended that the claims or interests of other
states, however adversely affected, provided no justification for
external involvement. Such wilful ignorance could be justified only if
international society did in fact practice collective security.
The realities of the post-World War II world, however, in
creating a bipolar regime of alliances, more approximated the balance
of power system than that of collective security. Far from letting
internal conflicts resolve themselves, external actors viewed them
through the lens of their effects in the division of power between the
West and the East. Indeed, internal conflicts were sometimes
fomented by the one power or the other in order to provide leverage
in the struggle between Western “democratic capitalism” and “sovietled communism.” And so, in a world in which under international
law societies supposedly were left to address their internal politics
free from outside interference, there were nonetheless such well
known cases of external intervention as Iran in 1953, Guatemala in
1954, Hungary in 1956, Cuba in 1961, Dominican Republic in 1965,
Czechoslovakia in 1968, Zaire in 1978, Afghanistan in 1979,
Granada in 1982, Nicaragua-El Salvador in 1981-1983, and Panama
in 1989. These examples are usually advanced as illustrating the
failings of non-intervention as a legal doctrine because it did not
prevent the big powers from doing what they could, while letting the
weak suffer because they must. Yet, the doctrine of non-intervention
has also been criticized for providing a shield for inaction and
indifference in such cases as Indonesia (1965) and Biafra (19671970). Other instances such as Pakistan/Bangladesh (1973-1974),
Cyprus (1974), Lebanon (1975-1982), Cambodia (1979-1980), and
Uganda (1980) have generated significantly differing reactions.
Whatever else may thus be said about the doctrine of nonintervention in the post-World War II world, the absence of instances
of its application was not one of its features. And this conclusion can
be reached based solely on the known instances of forcible
intervention. Yet, there certainly were other instances of intervention
that were undertaken covertly, and whose histories are yet to be
disclosed. For example, while United States involvement in the
change of the Mosadegh Government in Iran is no longer disputed,
that is simply a consequence of fortuitous disclosures.27 Extant
evidence in such cases as Congo (1960), South Vietnam (1963), and
27. See generally STEPHEN KINZER, ALL THE SHAH’S MEN (2008) (discussing
the 1953 C.I.A. coup in Iran, the rule of the Shah, and the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism in Iran).
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Afghanistan (1980-1989) provide support for claims of covert
forcible action. While it is generally accepted that the nonintervention prohibited under the charter is one that involves the use
of force,28 there is no reason to doubt that the charter prohibits the
covert application of force as readily as it does its overt use. Yet, the
covertness of an intervention may have the fallback virtue of
plausibly sustaining the normative force of the prohibition.
These numerous examples of forcible interventions
notwithstanding, the persistence of the doctrine of noninterference as
prescribed in the UN Charter can and has been vigorously defended,
so much so that the doctrine has been claimed to be a jus cogens
norm. The breadth of the acceptance of the principle, rather than a
tallying up of its breaches, it can be argued, is the preferable indicator
of its worth. An offender, it can be said, did not protest the existence
of the principle, but instead invariably sought to justify the violation
by appeal to a recognizable exception. The most obvious was that no
actual interference had occurred. Because the language of Article
2(4) speaks of “the use of force” or “threat of the use of force” that
violates the “territorial integrity or political independence” of a state,
it was not uncommon to contend that no use of force was involved, or
that such force was not directed at the territorial integrity or political
independence of a state. The supply of weaponry or the use of
sanctions—economic and/or military—was portrayed as being
outside of the scope of the prohibition.29 In those instances where the
use of force was indisputable, the two most common justifications
were that the intervention was in fact not an intervention because the
outside force had been invited by a duly constituted government of
the state (even where that government was brought about through
outside pressure),30 or that the force was an exigent measure

28. E.g., Lori F. Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and
Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (1989).
29. Cf. Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study In Legality Under
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 983 (1974)
(discussing the rejection of a Brazilian proposal to extend article 2(4) to include
economic coercion).
30. There are many examples of this throughout the 20th century. To name a
few: the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956; Soviet invasion
to halt Czech reform measures in 1968; Vietnamese support in Cambodia of newly
created “Peoples Republic of Kampuchea” in 1978; and invasion in support of proSoviet government in Afghanistan (1979). In comparison, the United States’ war
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necessary to protect or safeguard foreign nationals within the territory
of a disintegrating state.31 Rarely did states candidly acknowledge
that some necessity not contemplated or provided for under the
prohibition might be in play. The doctrine of nonintervention thus
came to be accepted as a cardinal rule of international law, even as it
was frequently violated.
The story thus far told of the post-World War II order only takes
one up to the end of the 1980s. The world made a new by the victors
of that war was substantially revised in the throes of the collapse of
one of its primary victors, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
That collapse was viewed and treated as the final—if overly
delayed—triumph victory of the post-World War II era: a victory not
simply of values, but also of political governance, economics, and of
military might.32 As was the case at the conclusion of World War II,
the victors of the post-Cold War order felt empowered to dictate the
terms of the peace, and to reorder the “new world” in its own image.
Part of that reordering has been the reinterpretation of the concept of
intervention, and with that reinterpretation, a reexamination of the
underlying forces of nationalism, self-determination and collective
security.
III. INTERVENTION AND THE NEOLIBERAL WORLD ORDER
If the treaty of Westphalia heralded the ascendance of liberalism
as an organizing concept in international relations, the international
system over the last quarter century has been shaped by a modified
form of liberalism that is fairly characterized as “neoliberal.”
Classical liberalism had as its focus the prescription of workable
principles for the constitution and governance of the state. Its primary
focus was on the distribution of rights and responsibilities within the
polity. Its application to international relations, while not
inconsequential, was that of a second order process. s previously
explained, the prohibition on intervention was as much intended to
in Vietnam was authorized in reaction to the “Gulf of Tonkin Incident” —an
alleged attack by the North Vietnamese Navy in 1964.
31. Examples of this justification can be found in the U.S. occupation of the
Dominican Republic in 1965 and the U.S. invasion of Granada in 1982.
32. For an assessment and critique of this take on the disintegration of the
Soviet Union, see JACK F. MATLOCK JR., SUPERPOWER ILLUSIONS: HOW MYTHS
AND FALSE IDEOLOGIES LED AMERICA ASTRAY – AND HOW TO RETURN TO
REALITY (2010) (arguing that the collapse of the Soviet Union weakened American
power).
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further the internal development of the polity as it was to create a
harmonious international society. The principle of non-intervention
was thus a secondary product of state building. The principle
operated in the political sphere, and did not take on its legal character
until the period following World War I.33 Neoliberalism, on the other
hand, seeks to apply aggressively and extraterritorially the ideals that
classical liberalism had enunciated for the internal constitution and
governance of the state. Its proponents have crafted the doctrine
explicitly for the purpose of creating a particularized structure of
international society. Neoliberalism sees the liberal ideal not as a
work-in-progress, but a completed structure that needs only to be
transplanted and cemented into those societies currently lacking its
foundations. Similarly, membership in international society, and the
distribution of rights and privileges within the society are based on
the extent to which a national society is seen to have fully absorbed
the elements of neoliberalism.
Precisely because of its proselytizing mission, neoliberalism
necessarily privileges interventionism. Neoliberalism has done so,
however, without rewriting the post-World War II legal text. To the
contrary, it has kept essentially intact the text of undifferentiated
equal national sovereignties.34 While ostensibly accepting the legal
doctrine of nonintervention, neoliberalism in practice has sought to
reorder international society through actions that in fact and in
practice selectively reinterpret and rewrite the text of noninterventionism. Neoliberalism squares the circle of seemingly
adhering to an unchanged legal text while radically reforming
expected behavior by centering and indeed essentializing the
contemporary European (or “Western”) experience.
Two world wars made evident to Europe the futility—or at least
the limits—of nationalism. Similarly, self-determination proved to be
no solution to the intractable issues of political independence and
national sovereignty. To the contrary, the experiences of former
European colonies, coupled with the integrating ethos of an emerging
European identity suggested that nationalism and self-determination
had become outmoded and certainly not satisfactory grounds for an
33. See supra Part II.
34. For a nuanced exploration of this central concept of international law, see
GERRY SIMPSON, GREAT POWERS AND OUTLAW STATES (2004) (examining the role
of Great Powers and outlaw states in an international context).
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international order that increasingly privileged the human rights of
the individual over the purported national rights of the state. Rather
than protecting the person by shielding the collective from outside
interference, the emerging European experiment—emphasizing as it
did, free movements across national territorial boundaries—amply
demonstrated that the person is more secure when her ties to the
collective are viewed as elastic and pragmatic. Neoliberalism thus
fostered the internationalization of these insights which could only
enrich individual liberty in otherwise authoritarian societies or
dictatorial regimes.
But applying the lessons of the European experience to other
societies has turned out not to be entirely salutary. The difficulties—
indeed contradictions—of changing legal rules through selective
practice rather than through a conscious rewrite of the text of the
rules may be best demonstrated by a brief survey of interventionist
moments in the post-Cold War period and in distilling the lessons
they suggest for an understanding of current views on intervention.
In the aftermath of the disintegration of the Communist-led
governments of Eastern Europe, the international order, in spite of its
rhetoric of “universalism,” in fact adhered to a practice of ideological
segmentation. The blocs conveniently may be classified into four
groupings of states. In the first were the continuing heirs of
Westphalia and of liberalism. The core states in this block were in
Western Europe and North America, but also included a handful of
other rich industrial states, notably in Asia. Its center of gravity was
the United States, and backed up by the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, this was by far the most influential block. It possessed
the certainty of correctness that is conferred by success. It had not
only the economic and military resources with which to propagate its
views, but the intellectual foundations as well. Above all else, it
confronted a demoralized cohort of rudderless states that hitherto had
constituted enemies in a bipolar division of the world. For these
states, the certainty of moral rectitude combined with political
capacity to create legal legitimacy.
The second group of states was made up of the erstwhile
opposition block consisting of communist-led European societies.
Politics in these societies revealed profound fractures between the
leaders and the ruled that had been submerged under communism. A
reawakened “civil society” seemed determined to reassert a heritage
of the classical liberal ideas that were interrupted by the two world
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wars. This group of states viewed themselves as much heirs to the
European enlightenment as were the West European states. Like
reformed proponents of a creed, their zeal in announcing and
promoting the good news of modern liberalism matched—if it did not
exceed—that of their cousins in the first group. What they lacked in
physical resources was made up, however, by appeal to experience.
Any doubt as to the superiority of neoliberalism could always be laid
to rest by the testimonials of the successes of the second in the
transition from illiberal to liberal democracies and market capitalism.
The third group of states had constituted the core of the
nonaligned states in a bipolar world. Pragmatic in outlook and
uncommitted to any hard and fast ideology these states drawn
primarily from what was referred to as “the third world” had, through
their sheer numbers, sustained the balance of power in the
international system through much of the 1960s and 1970s. Their
support had been courted by both of the ideological blocs of the Cold
War, even as they themselves sought to focus attention on the
generation and distribution of wealth across borders. Drawn
predominantly from Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the economic
crises of the 1980s had greatly diminished the capacity of many of
the states in this group to maintain the independence of action that
they had so flamboyantly exhibited in the preceding two decades.35
The disintegration of the Communist ideological bloc, coupled with
the weak economic state many of these countries faced at the
beginning of the 1990s with rare exceptions sidelined them in the
emerging post-Cold War politics of international relations. In
particular, they proved incapable of providing a countervailing
response to the practical rewriting of the doctrine of non-intervention.
The current rewriting of the practice of intervention has occurred
primarily in terms of relations with and within a fourth group of
states. The group has been carved out almost exclusively from the
third group (with a handful sharing similar experiences to some states
in the second group); a phenomenon that itself deserves some
attention. This fourth group of states is characterized by internal
instability, but that is hardly a sufficient distinguishing feature. Many
35. Cf. David Fidler, Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the
Developing World, and the Future Direction of International Law, 2 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 29 (2003) (discussing the rise of “Third World” challenges to Western
hegemony in modern international law).
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of the states in the second and third groups have, over the course of
the last twenty-five years experienced instances of instability. The
sort of instability at play in the fourth group is what might be termed
“state collapse” or “state failure.” Whether intervention is in fact the
cause or the effect of that failure is not always clear; what is
evident—and clearly distinguishes the fourth group from the third—
is the unapologetic claim for intervention that has emerged within
policy-shaping and policy-making circles in the West, and as
suggested by events in Crimea-Ukraine, perhaps in a re-energized
East as well.
The “no apologies” (or “aggressive”) disregard of noninterventionism over the last quarter-century has not of course been
without reasonable justification. The question raised by the new
approach is whether the textual rules ought not to be rewritten, or at
least given formal reinterpretation. The answer may well lie in a
closer look at some of the instances that have led to the intervention,
and determining whether these instances are unique so that justified
intervention in the particular case should be seen as aberrational, or
whether these instances of state collapse meriting intervention may
be sufficiently widespread that the rules of intervention—if they are
not to be a mockery of themselves—ought to be rewritten.
The first significant indication of a change in attitude about the
legal rules on intervention was manifested in the reaction to the
international society’s involvement in the governance of Somalia. In
1992, the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the
organization’s charter, authorized external intervention in what was
entirely a domestic conflict among admittedly armed factions within
the country.36 The Council purported to be acting within the narrow
carve out in the Organization’s Charter for lawful involvement in the
internal affairs of a member state. The justification offered for the
intervention was “humanitarian,” a rationale that a decade later was
to be renamed “the responsibility to protect” (R2P).37 But it is
36. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. Doc. S/RES/794 (Dec. 3, 1992) (authorizing UN
intervention in Somalia).
37. See generally ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (2011) (discussing the idea that the international
community has an obligation to proect at-risk populations); See Alyse Prawde, The
Contribution of Brazil's 'Responsibility while Protecting' Proposal to the
'Responsibility to Protect' Doctrine, 29 MD. J. INT’L L. 184 (2014). Cf. Ruth
Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Notion, 12 AM. U. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 903 (1997).
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impossible to understand the Somali intervention outside of the then
emerging hubris of a proclaimed “new world order.” Having
surprisingly acted in concert to reverse the invasion of Kuwait by
Iraq— indisputably an international conflict that threatened
international peace and security—the Security Council under the
unquestioned leadership of the United States felt empowered to act in
ways hitherto unknown to it. Somalia seemed to present on its face an
easy case; the conjunction of a minimal call on resources, the purest
of motives (verging on the altruistic), and a highly likely successful
outcome. But Somalia did not turn out successfully. Indeed, the
reverberations of the intervention continue as these lines are written.
When Rwanda next presented a “humanitarian” case for
intervention, international society shied away from too close an
involvement in the resolution of that internal conflict, even though
there were United Nations “peacekeepers” already on the ground.38
Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were killed, and the
reverberations of those killings continue. Seemingly paralyzed by
these two experiences, the UN system stood by in indecision as a
reinvigorated and assertive NATO, on the fiftieth anniversary of its
creation, waged an air war against Serbia to compel her to give up
control of Kosovo, a province with a dominant population of
Albanians. The reason advanced by NATO and its sponsors was the
need to forestall an imminent “genocide,” or “ethnic cleansing”;
although it is virtually impossible to validate this explanation against
competing ones such as the need to bring the Serbian leader,
Milosevic to heel for challenging the post-Cold War Order of Europe
and the Balkans.
The Kosovo war was a military success. Yet, an influential
review of its facts and logic concluded that it was an “illegal” if a
“legitimate” undertaking.39 Presumably, neither the rectitude of moral
motivations nor military success sufficed to confer legal propriety on
intervention. This, at any rate, appears to have been the political
conclusion reached by the heads of states and governments of the
38. See, e.g., ROMEO DALLAIRE, SHAKE HANDS WITH THE DEVIL: THE FAILURE
HUMANITY IN RWANDA (2003) (detailing a UN worker’s first-hand account of
the genocide in Rwanda).
39. INDEP. INT’L COMM. ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT (2000) available
at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/6D26FF88119644CFC125
6989005CD392-thekosovoreport.pdf.
OF
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member states of the United Nations system at the turn of the twentyfirst century. Imbued with a millennial spirit for the reconstruction of
the international legal order, these leaders sought to reconcile the
growing claim for intervention on humanitarian grounds with the
preexisting legal prohibition. Doing so required that these politicians
marry two philosophies that are at odds. In the first, relying on the
work of a Canadian Government sponsored “independent” panel,
they had to buy into the idea that humanitarian intervention was
driven by altruistic motives. Secondly, they were confronted with the
need to read just their conception of sovereignty as entailing the right
of each state to determine for itself the terms of the relationship
between the state and the citizen. The result was the compromise that
has come to be termed “responsibility to protect.”
Although the phrase is now routinely deployed to express the
view that the “international community” has a “responsibility” to
protect persons threatened by mass atrocities, a straightforward
reading of the language actually employed makes plain the nature of
the compromise. First, it reiterates a truism: that all states have the
obligation to protect the vulnerable members of the society over
whom the state claims sovereignty or jurisdiction. The RTP
Declaration simply emphasizes that this incontestable international
law obligation continues to exist even—and perhaps especially—at
moments of mass atrocities.40 Secondly, the Declaration recognizes
and accepts the possibility that a state may be unable to discharge that
responsibility; in which case, international society cannot rely on the
shield of state sovereignty to evade stepping into the shoe of the
ineffectual state.41 Notably, nothing in the declarations of the heads
of states and governments imposed an affirmative—let alone an
imperative duty on any external state or group of states to employ the
use of force against another state on humanitarian grounds. The
prohibition of forceful intervention, even in so-called humanitarian
situations, is especially apposite where the conflicts among the
members of a society go to basic questions of the nature and structure
40. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, ¶ 138, G.A. Res. 60/1, U.N. Doc
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). Pointedly, the Resolution emphasizes the standard
elements of cooperation in international law; the encouragement of pacific means
for resolving disputes, whether internal or international; and the furnishing of
assistance by the international society to the state in the latter’s discharge of its
obligations.
41. Id. ¶ 139.([The international community]…[is] prepared to take collective
action…should peaceful means be inadequate…to protect [] populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.”).
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of the arrangements for the internal organization of a state; that is, to
the source of a state’s claim of sovereignty. But it is almost always in
these situations that proponents of RTP, imbued with a substantive
preference for a particular neoliberal outcome, have most often
clamored for intervention. But it is perhaps unavoidable that in an age
in which the so-called civil society, having the resources but lacking
the generalized responsibility and accountability of the nation state,
has come to play a central role in the definition of international law,
established principles can be cavalierly reformulated. Such a
conclusion seems inescapable given the ease with which the language
of “responsibility to protect” has become interpreted as authorizing
intervention by foreign states in the overthrow of governments in
weak states. In any event, proponents of the “responsibility to
protect” trot it out only in those situations in which they believe that
the responsibility can be discharged at minimal costs to themselves.
They do not assert it as a duty to be satisfied in situations where it
would be at substantial inconvenience or hardship to international
society or the foreign interloper.
The debate over humanitarian intervention is of course only a
subset of the much broader issue of external involvement in the
internal affairs of a state. If in fact we inhabited a “borderless world”
in which persons and their governments have equal concern for the
wellbeing of others without regard to nationality, the question of
intervention (at least as framed in law through politics) would
evaporate. But we do not. Indeed, the countries most likely to insist
on the continuing force of national borders are those of the wealthy
West, especially when confronted by the prospects of mass
immigration from the much poorer rest. Nonintervention—the legal
rules crafted in an age when legal positivism reigned supreme—
sought to privilege sovereignty as an affirmation of the capacity and
right of a self-determined population group to engage in selfgovernment (and indeed misgovernment) free of the shackles of a
superior society. One of the remarkable features of the post-Cold War
international order has been the reaffirmation of a particular form of
self-determination, which in popular parlance we call “democracy.”
Along with “humanitarian intervention,” the promotion of
“democracy” has furnished an additional argument for reordering and
recalibrating the principle of nonintervention. At about the same time
that neoliberalism was being touted as constituting the “end of
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history,”42 democracy was being presented as a “human right.”43 The
elements of the “right” were never comprehensively articulated, but it
was assumed that they more or less approximated those that were in
practice in the liberal democracies of the West. Self-determination
was seen to be available only to a people that were in fact democratic.
Intervention might be appropriate then not only in furtherance of
humanitarian norms, but of “democracy,” so defined. Even in the
absence of the threat of mass atrocities, intervention may be engaged
in to rid a society of illiberal tendencies and pariah statesmen. The
currency that appeared to matter was the capacity for successful
intervention.
It is against this backdrop that the most recent instances of
intervention should be evaluated. As it happens, the three that have
generated the most controversy in the last three years implicate the
most recognizable three political power centers of contemporary
international society. These are the intervention by NATO (backed by
the United Nations) in a Libyan civil war; the attempted intervention
by an assortment of states in the Syrian civil war; and the ongoing
civil crisis in Ukraine. Each challenges the continuing force of the
prohibitions on intervention, even as modified by post-Cold War
practice. These comments conclude by inquiring whether these
examples suggest the need for textual clarification of emerging
doctrines or whether the international system is better off by leaving
well enough alone.
Both of the civil wars in Libya and in Syria are archetypes of the
civil strife that beset much of the non-Western world in the wake of
decolonization. For these inorganic states brought into being through
the artificial manipulations of European powers, their current civil
wars may not be unlike those experienced by and which shaped
European national societies at the dawn of the modern era. They
certainly are the sort of civil strife that have beset several postcolonial African and Asian states over the last two generations. These
are wars in which population groups, finding themselves in proximity
to each other, but set apart by such cleavages as religion, clan-based
kinship relationships, and poorly distributed economic resources
have, as is all-too-human, sought to restructure their relationships
42. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST
MAN (1992) (predicting the collapse of authoritarian regimes in favor of liberal
democracies).
43. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 46 (1992) (presenting democracy as a “global entitlement”).
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through violence. In the case of Libya, the dominant cleavage was
territorial; in Syria, religious. Rwanda, Bangladesh, Biafra, and
Indonesia, to suggest a few examples, have undergone similar
experiences. Similarly, alongside the civil wars in Syria and Libya
were “uprisings” in Tunisia and Egypt, which collectively have come
to be referred to as “the Arab Spring.” These latter, as in the former,
again reflected the working out of societal cleavages. In the latter
two cases, they have been framed as questions of “modernity” and
“secularism” in conflict with religious and/or political orthodoxy. In
short, civil strife in the developing world is best viewed as
continuation of the struggle to substitute the artificially created
societies of the colonial era with modern organic communities. It is
asking too much to hope or believe that the processes of national
community formation in these societies will be any less violent than
it had been in Europe.
What then, it might be asked, distinguishes Libya and Syria from
the other examples, at least sufficiently so to make them paradigms
for external intervention? The easy response is to assert that Libya
and Syria have involved “mass atrocities” or, at least, their
likelihood. But what made mass atrocities more likely in these two
states than in the others experiencing socio-political upheavals? An
equally easy response points to the character of the personalities in
charge of these countries. Yet any serious evaluation of these
explanations readily demonstrates their fallacies. The leaderships in
Syria and in Libya had been in power and with as much contentment
and dissatisfaction over the forty or so years of their reign, as had the
leaderships in Tunisia and Egypt. If the leaderships differed among
themselves, it was in the nature of the external alliances they had
formed over those years. The Libyan and Syrian rulers had hitched
their wagons to non-Western horses. They fell into that camp that
neoliberal internationalists, with unwarranted virtuousness, referred
to as “rogue” or “pariah states.” Tunisian, Egyptian, and Bahraini
rulers, on the other hand, had aligned themselves with the West. No
sooner had the social uprisings in Libya and Syria commenced than
leaders in the West openly demanded that these leaders step down. If
external involvement was confined to demands for “regime change,”
however impolitic that might have been under the old standards, that
would hardly in and of itself constitute impermissible intervention.

2014]

RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR RICHARDSON’S KEYNOTE

75

What made intervention in Libya and Syria distinctive was the
active recourse to the use of force to bring about the overthrow of
recognized governments. “Responsibility to protect” has been
invoked as the justifying legal principle, but the chronology of events
fairly raises the issue of cause and effect. Was the mass violence and
inchoate mass atrocities in Libya precipitated by or in response the
externally driven injection of force? Similarly, in the case of Syria, it
should be asked whether external intervention by the West and the
Gulf Arab countries through the direct supply of armaments and
diplomatic support are not responsible for the scale of the violence
and the substantial loss of lives and sufferings visited on that country.
Can it be that far from preventing or remedying humanitarian
catastrophes, the open and notorious interventions encouraged by the
rhetoric of “responsibility to protect” may be creating the conditions
for mass atrocities? The logic for finding an affirmative response to
this question is not hard to see. In the first place, despite the claim of
disinterested humanitarianism, it takes little tweaking of the
imagination to see that the selective use of the doctrine serves
primarily the interest of the outsider.
It is not accidental that of the four states at issue, the two over
which assertions of the “right” to engage in a discharge of the socalled “responsibility” are those with which the outsiders had ulterior
motives and interests in overthrowing the leadership. Nor is it
accidental that those who spearheaded the claimed humanitarian
intervention are countries with historical grievances against the
leaderships of the countries In which interventions have been
sought.44 It was precisely concerns over such selective use of force
44. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya had of course been a bête noire in the West
since his unilateral seizure of crude oil concessions that had been given to the
Western oil companies. ANTHONY SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS (1976)
(discussing and analyzing the history of the world’s largest oil companies). He did
not endear himself either to the United States or to France by apparently financing
subversive activities against airlines of both countries. Similarly, the Assad family
that had ruled Syria since 1970 had aligned the country during the Cold War with
the Soviet Union, and unlike other Arab countries, such as Egypt, apparently did
not switch allegiance to the West even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. That
France led the West’s thrusts in both Libya and Syria is especially noteworthy. As
early as 2003, in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq, one of
France’s most prominent intellectual on foreign affairs sought to carve up the
projection of Western power between the United States and Western Europe.
Notably, he argued for collaboration between the United States and France in
matters of “enlightened intervention” in the Middle-East and Africa. Dominique
Moïsi, Reinventing the West, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Nov. 1, 2003),
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that engendered the principles of nationalism and self-determination
that have underpinned the doctrine of nonintervention. But of even
more significance, whatever may be one’s position on the causation
conundrum, there is no denying that in Libya, as in Syria and
Somalia, the consequences of the purported humanitarian
intervention has been anything but remedial. All three countries
continue to experience substantial instability and insecurity. Yet,
having demonstrated Western might, those who called for
humanitarian intervention pretty much lose interest in the welfare of
the locals who are left to endure the consequences of the
bombardment of their societies. At best, the result of “humanitarian
intervention” appears to be the interruption of the organic formation
of the state. Politics within these societies is shown to be dependent
on outside intervention, which in turn does not last long enough to
assure return to order. Again, the narrow domestic interests of the
outside intervener, far more than the internal disorder of the broken
society determines when help is to be withdrawn.45 Might there be a
lesson in the indisputable fact that Rwanda, the ignored case for
humanitarian intervention is proving to be a good deal more resilient
as a society, and more of an organic state than are Somalia and Libya.
From the perspective of an international lawyer, surely one of
the most striking features of the resort to the use of force over the last
quarter century is the paucity of its examination in legal terms by the
politicians, policy-makers and academics who ordinarily invoke “the
rule of law” as a distinguishing feature of life in Western societies.
Nowhere has the absence of resort to legal arguments been more
conspicuous by its absence than in the arena of discourses on the
permissibility of interventions. In both Syria and Libya, as examples,
it is notable that aside from the suspect justification of humanitarian
intervention, international society ordinarily did not evaluate, even in
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59367/dominique-moÃ¯si/reinventing-thewest.
45. An example is the debate over U.S. withdrawal of her forces from Iraq and
Afghanistan. The debate has been framed primarily in terms of the continuing
threat, if any, to the United States and the West from lingering “terrorists” in those
states, not in terms of the security of life, liberty or property for the citizens of
those states. E.g. Celeste Ward Gventer, Adjusting the War on Terror to Fit the
Times,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
4,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/03/04/fighting-afghan
-terrorism-without-troops/adjusting-the-war-on-terror-in-afghanistan-to-fit-thetimes (describing anti-terrorism goals in the context of leaving Afghanistan).
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the most cursory of terms, the propriety under international law of
external intervention in Libya or in Syria. To be sure, the rhetoric of
humanitarianism was occasionally invoked, but even here, the
considerations were presented as self-evidently moral and practical in
character, not as a discourse on the relevance of law to the decisionmaking process. In Syria, for example, despite the claims about
providing “lethal” and “non-lethal” support, no “fly zones,” and
“punitive strikes” in “retaliation” for the use of chemical weapons,
the policy-makers wrestling with these issues did not refer to
international law as providing any relevant guidance.46 The focus was
in terms of the practicalities of implementation, and the likely
effectiveness of the measures as sources of deterrence or of
retribution. Internal political and military considerations, much more
than the applicability of international law shaped the discourse.47
It should therefore gladden the heart of an international lawyer
when a Western politician like Mr. Obama invokes the legal doctrine
of nonintervention not as an afterthought, but as the driving
explanation for a policy preference. This has been the position taken
by the United States in its critique of Russian behavior in the current
Crisis over the separation of Crimea from Ukraine and its absorption
by the Russian Federation. As the United States has contended, a
“fundamental principle” in play there—as elsewhere—is that the
Ukrainian people deserve the opportunity to determine their own
future.”48 That is the basic principle at stake in all cases where an
outsider feels inclined to intervene in the internal conflict of any
society. It is a principle that states are not at liberty to grant or
withhold as they individually see fit. Rather, it applies to all except
46. About the only exception to this silence was President Barack Obama’s
terse and dismissive reference to international law in his August 31, 2013 speech:
“I’m comfortable going forward without the approval of a United Nations Security
Council that, so far, has been completely paralyzed and unwilling to hold Assad
accountable”; “If we won’t enforce accountability in the face of this heinous act,
what does it say about our resolve to stand up to others who flout fundamental
international rules?” President Barack Obama, Remarks on Syria (Aug. 31, 2013).
The obvious internal inconsistency in this appeal to legality might be entertaining,
except that this self-serving framing of international law as no more than the
expression of U.S. foreign policy preferences has been the hallmark of the
country’s approach to legality over the last quarter-century.
47. See id. (“Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United
States should take military action against Syrian regime targets. . . . We would not
put boots on the ground. . . . But having made my decision as commander-in-chief
based on what I am convinced is our national security interests, I am also mindful
that I am the President of the world’s oldest constitutional democracy”).
48. President Barack Obama, Statement on Ukraine (Feb. 28, 2014).
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in the most exceptional of circumstances. As President Obama and
his agents have aptly summarized the relevant international law
doctrine, it is the obligation of all states to stand for the sovereignty,
territorial integrity, political independence, and, if the people so
choose, the “democratic future” of their state.49 The pity is that these
pronouncements come not as those of a member of the UN system
with a principled stance on the doctrine of intervention, but as the
expedient statement of a politician that has been caught off-guard by
the capacity of an opponent to resort to the same unprincipled
conduct and justification in which the West has been engaging for
quite some considerable time.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West has acted and
behaved like the colossus that bestrides a narrow world. In the
process, rather than negotiating the rules of the road in international
relations, it has tended to lay them down as edicts. Legal rules may
be formulated through the use of power and political structures, but
what distinguishes law from both power and politics is that once the
rule is formulated, it takes a life of its own, and acts to constrain even
the rule makers. In rewriting the rules of intervention to meet its
immediate and narrow preferences, the West opened the door to
Russia to make the arguments that it now advances, and which the
West now finds unappetizing. In explaining its policies with regard to
Crimea and Ukraine, Russia essentially mouths three of the same
platitudes that the West has employed to justify neoliberal
interventionism. First, the overthrow of an elected Government in
Kiev by a street mob said to be sponsored or backed by the West
(according to the Russians) rendered the replacement Government
illegal and illegitimate. As a result, the predominantly Russianspeaking population of the Crimea in the application of the principle
of self-determination was entitled to secede from Ukraine and to seek
the protection of Russia. Secondly, the nature of the revolt in the
Ukraine, mounted in the main by “right-wing nationalists” and
“fascists” presented a threat to the human rights of the population
group in Crimea. Third, given past historical associations, the
Russian Federation retained continuing interests and rights in seeing
to the well-being of Crimeans. These arguments may differ in their
particulars from those that have been advanced to explain the role of
former colonial powers in the interventionist politics of such societies
49. Id.
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as Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast and even Syria, but it does not take a
whole lot of stretching to draw analogies among them. The difference
between 2014 and 1999 lies in Russia feeling empowered to rely on
such arguments in explaining what might otherwise be thought as a
clear violation of international law. In doing so it plausibly finds
precedents in the conduct of Western states and NATO in the last
quarter century.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
As Professor Richardson frames the problem of intervention:
The major continuing question for international law in
our Global Village is whether as a dynamic legal
process of authority and control, it will in its
decisions, interpretations and large range of actors
simply reflect the dominant patterns of power and
control that arise from unappraised sources in the
Village. Or, whether its decisions and interpretations
will normatively aim to steadily shape a better global
community towards greater sharing of human values
…”50
I cannot say that my comments have seriously grappled with the
binary characterization suggested by this framing of the problem. But
there is, I think, no denying the dynamic character of international
law and I hope this Comment has indicated the continuities as well as
the discontinuities in the international law making process. Whether
the process is essentially normative in character is, to my mind,
highly debatable.
Words have a way of surviving their original usage. Sovereignty
and self-determination are two obvious examples, as indeed is
“intervention.” These terms will continue to be extensively deployed
in international law. It is equally likely that they will acquire over
time meanings that are different from their current references. What
are bound to remain effectively unaltered are the desires of human
beings singly and collectively to coexist in an atmosphere of mutual
support while retaining the right to negotiate their own separate
futures as they best see fit. Similarly, contrary to the dominant ethos
of global society after World War II, the move towards the even
50. Richardson, supra note 3, at 13 (emphasis added).
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distribution of power and resources is by no means a guaranteed
success. Indeed, as recent data indicates, while it may be that
international society is becoming better able to assure the satisfaction
of minimum basic needs to the vast majority of the population, there
is little reason to be overly optimistic that the result would be the
increased convergence rather than continuing (or even widening)
divergence in the basic allocation and distribution of (again to borrow
from Professor Richardson) of “basic values” and goods as “power,
wealth, rights, loyalties, authority and access to global resources.”51
In international relations, no less than in domestic and private affairs,
the post-Cold War neoliberal moment has demonstrated that there is
nothing inexorable about the march toward progress of any particular
kind. And yet, Professor Richardson is certainly right that all of
humanity will have to work within a shared global space. There is no
other choice. The question for intervention in this environment of
continuing differences within a shared and sometimes
claustrophobically confining space is how best to modulate the
inequalities which can be quite glaring. At a minimum, the well-off
will have to learn that the idea of humanity isn’t simply about
shaping the world in our preferred image, but genuinely making an
attempt to understand the constraints within which the less well-off
live their lives, and recognize and accept that the latter’s values are
no less worthy of comprehension and deference because of those
constraints. Societies are organic creations. They do not come into
being simply because one wills them to exist. Like chains, they are
only as good as their weakest links, and like any metal, they are
strengthened through patient tempering and nurturing, not simply by
constantly being hammered down. But this is no license for
indifference. One can show concern and interest by seeking to
persuade rather than to punish. There might be satisfaction and a
sense of self-fulfillment in the latter, but it is the former that creates
the grounding for longer-term productive returns on expended
resources.
For the purpose of trying to make less abstruse the thoughts
expressed in the preceding paragraph, reconsider the concept of the
“responsibility to protect.” Witnessing the mass atrocities of Europe
prior to and during World War II, and the internal conflicts incident
to state formation in Africa and Asia after World War II, there is no
51. Id.
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denying the need to provide mechanisms by which severely
fragmented societies can address their problems. The text of R2P as
articulated in the World Summit Conference outcome can hardly be
faulted as a reasonable attempt to take account of the need for the
responsibility of nation states to seek to address, in the first instance,
the sources and causes of their fragmentation. Nor can one seriously
argue against the requirement that the international system furnish
whatever encouragement or assistance it can to the government and
people of the fractured state as they seek to disentangle their society
from the spider web of civil strife. One can debate the nature and
scope of that encouragement and assistance, but as long as it remains
secondary to the primary responsibilities of those whose lives and
hopes are at stake, no genuine objection seriously can be taken. The
difficulty with R2P arises with assigning to the international system
the primary responsibility for restoring peace and security to an
internally fragmented society. The international system, acting
through the Security Council, and within the parameters of the
Chapter VI functions of the Council arguably legitimately and legally
can contribute to the prevention and protection of a citizenry whose
government consents. The difficulty arises where the Council—and
through it the international system—purports to act on its own
mandate and independently of a functioning government in matters
that would otherwise constitute an intervention in the sovereignty,
territorial integrity or political independence of the state. Such
exercise of power, which commentators in the West have become
habituated to following the end of the Cold War is likely to continue
to be resisted by others. The primary reason is the selective character
of the intervention—probably an unavoidable human trait. But it
should also be rejected because it denies agency and humanity to
those whom it ostensibly intends to help. As already explained, the
record of societies that at some point seemed fragmented beyond
repair, but which were left to resolve their problems—the Indian subcontinent, Nigeria-Biafra, and Rwanda, to name a few examples—is,
by measures of several magnitude, superior to those in which the
West has felt itself called upon in the name of R2P or like to
intervene: Somalia, Libya, and Syria. But there remains one possible
situation in which R2P when narrowly and prudently construed may
be necessary. It is where the internal fragmentation is so complete
that there is in fact no Government or state worth its name. This may
well have been the case in Somalia and possibly in the Central
African Republic. Here, the principle of nonintervention may be
inapposite because there is no state or society whose territorial
integrity or political independence may be worth respecting. But even
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here, R2P should be resorted to with care. The extent to which data is
subject to self-deluding interpretation is all too obvious. One could
have argued that Rwanda would have satisfied this condition in 1994,
yet, in retrospect, it is obvious that Rwandans were perfectly capable
of muddling through their problems and emerging at the end of it a
much more solidified society.

